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We present authorized quantum computation, where only a user with a non-cloneable quantum
authorization key can perform a unitary operation created by an authenticated programmer. The
security of our authorized quantum computation is based on the quantum computational complexity
problem of forging the keys from an obfuscated quantum gate sequence. Under the assumption of the
existence of a sufficiently-random gate shuffling algorithm, the problem is shown to be in the NQP
(Non-deterministic Quantum Polynomial)-hard class by reducing it to a NQP-Complete problem,
the exact non-identity check problem. Therefore, our authorized quantum computation can be
computationally secure against attacks using quantum computers.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Lx, 03.67.Dd
Consider the world once quantum computers exist and
are widely used. In this world, unitary operations are the
programs of quantum computers. For the programmer of
the quantum programs, they are important intellectual
properties and it is important to protect the copyright
of the programs. On the other hand, for the user of the
program, they do not need to know about the details of
the program, they just want to perform a task, as long
as the created by the authenticated programmer.
Such a situation can be solved if the programmer en-
codes a program so that the original program is only
performable for users with non-cloneable authorization
keys, distributes the encoded programs via an authen-
ticator, and sends the authorization keys directly to the
users. Then, anyone can download the encoded programs
via the authenticator, which are guaranteed to have been
made by the programmer, but it is performable only by
the authorized user. In this letter, we propose a scheme of
authorized quantum computation that allows this task in
quantum computational security, as a possible new quan-
tum cryptographic primitive.
In our scheme, we employ both quantum advantages
and quantum limitations for its security. To protect the
original programs from unauthorized users, the encoding
process of the program is two-fold. One is an encryp-
tion process of introducing quantum authorization keys
so that computation is not possible without using the
correct key. The keys are unknown quantum states for
any users (even for authorized users) and their anonymity
and non-cloneability is ensured by quantum mechanics.
The other is an obfuscation process that hides the basis
of the keys in the encoded program. It is known that
classically, obfuscating programs is impossible [1]. For
quantum settings, existence of obfuscation with the help
of quantum states is an open problem [2]. In this letter,
by introducing the concept of gate shuffling algorithms,
we show a sufficient condition for the obfuscation process
where forging the quantum authorization keys is compu-
tationally difficult even using quantum computers. We
stress that we do not obfuscate the quantum program it-
self, but the identity of the quantum authorization keys.
We note that if we do not require the authenticity
of the program, blind quantum computation [3], which
aims to perform a unitary operation without revealing
the identity of input states, can be used for similar
tasks. Blind quantum computation is a two-party proto-
col based on informational security and it requires multi-
ple quantum/classical communications during computa-
tion. In contrast, our authorized quantum computation
is a semi-public protocol based on computational secu-
rity to ensure the authenticity of the program and no
communication is required during computation.
We first present a construction of authorized quantum
computation to sketch our scheme. We regard unitary
operations to be quantum programs. Note that we con-
sider only polynomial quantum programs, namely, uni-
tary operations represented by an array of a polyno-
mial number p(n) of elementary unitary gates. A uni-
tary operation U is described by a polynomial classi-
cal bit sequence {0, 1}∗. We call this classical informa-
tion as a quantum gate sequence of U and denote it by
x(U). (Throughout this letter, we use capital letters to
represent unitary operations and small letters to repre-
sent their quantum gate sequences.) Due to the non-
uniqueness of the gate sequence representation for uni-
tary operations, we consider a set of all quantum gate
sequences for a unitary operation U consisting of at most
p(n) elementary gate arrays and denote it by gp(n)(U),
or simply g(U) if the specification of a function p(n) is ir-
relevant. Since calculations of the matrix representation
of a unitary operation require exponential computational
power in terms of n, we have to rely on the polynomial
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2gate sequence representation of unitary operations when
n is large. Now consider a programmer who wants to
encode a unitary operation Ui (where i is an index for
specifying the unitary operation) acting on a n-qubit in-
put Hilbert space H⊗ninput.
Step 1: The programmer extends the Ui into another
unitary operation G acting on a larger Hilbert space
H⊗(m+n) by adding a m-qubit Hilbert space H⊗mkey of
quantum authorization keys in front of the input Hilbert
space. (We often simply denote the quantum authoriza-
tion key as the key.) This extension is similar to the
programmable quantum gate arrays proposed by Nielsen
and Chuang [4]. The extended unitary operator G trans-
forms G(|i〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉) = |i〉 ⊗ Ui |ϕ〉, where {Ui} is a set of
P = 2k (1 ≤ i ≤ 2k  2m) unitary operations for an ar-
bitrary input state |ϕ〉 ∈ H⊗ninput, and {|i〉 ∈ H⊗mkey } is the
corresponding key states in a computational basis speci-
fied by a binary bit sequence {0, 1}k. The number of the
key qubits k should be taken to be of order log(n) for
restricting the total gate number of G to be in polyno-
mial of n. Thus the (m−k)-qubit dummy space H⊗(m−k)dummy
is introduced in the key space. A construction of G for
{Ui} is shown in Fig. 1, where M1 and M2 are random
unitary operations acting on the dummy qubit space.
Step 2: By applying random unitary operations L and
R on only H⊗mkey as G → G′ = (L ⊗ I)G(R ⊗ I) where I
denotes an identity operator of an appropriate dimension,
we create a key state |φi〉 = R† |i〉 satisfying
G′(|φi〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉) = |φ′i〉 ⊗ Ui |ϕ〉 , (1)
where |φ′i〉 = L |φi〉 is the key state after performing G′.
The programmer issues only one key for each authorized
user. This step is the encryption process of the keys.
Step 3: The essence of our obfuscation process is in the
non-uniqueness of the quantum gate sequence represen-
tation for unitary operations. The programmer trans-
forms the series of quantum gate sequences x(G′) =
x(R)x(G)x(L) into another obfuscated quantum gate se-
quence x′(G′), where extracting information of R and L
from x′(G′) is not possible in a polynomial time even
using quantum computers. We call this transformation
of quantum gate sequences as quantum gate shuffling.
Later, we present a sufficient condition for a quantum
gate shuffling algorithm for performing the obfuscation
process.
Step 4: Classical information of the obfuscated gate se-
quence x′(G′) is delivered to the trusted third party (au-
thenticator) by the programmer. It is authenticated and
announced publicly. On the other hand, the program-
mer directly sends the key |φi〉 to an authorized user via
a quantum channel. A pair of an authenticated public
program x′ and a set of authorization private keys {|φi〉}
is created.
Step 5: The user performs a unitary operation G′ de-
scribed by x′(G′) on the joint state of the key |φi〉 and
an input state |ϕ〉 of user’s choice. Then the state Ui |ϕ〉
is obtained. If the user does not use the correct key |φi〉
and performs G′, the resulting joint state cannot be a
FIG. 1: A construction of gate sequences for the unitary op-
erations G and G′. See the text for notations.
desired state and is highly likely to be entangled. The
security of our scheme will be discussed later.
We note that by performing the reverse quantum gate
sequence using the used key state |φ′i〉, the reverse unitary
operation U†i can be also performed and the original key
|φi〉 is regained by G′†(|φ′i〉⊗|ϕ〉) = |φi〉⊗U†i |ϕ〉. There-
fore, we can recycle the quantum authorization key as
long as it keeps coherence.
In this scheme, security depends on the obfuscation
process given in Step 3. To present a sufficient condition
for obfuscation, we investigate strategies for a malicious
user, Eve. We consider that Eve wants to perform the
original unitary operation Ui without using the quantum
authorization key |φi〉 issued by the programmer. A pow-
erful Eve may also be able to tap the quantum channels
and steal other N keys {|φj〉}j=1,...,N where j 6= i, and
analyze the quantum gate sequence x′(G′) to obtain a
quantum gate sequence of Ui. If the key is stolen, there
is no way to prevent Eve from performing Ui, but we need
to prevent Eve creating an unauthorized copy of the key.
We assume that Eve may destroy extra keys {|φj〉} for
j 6= i, but does not destroy the key |φi〉 for performing Ui.
We regard that the key should be kept as the evidence of
the authorized user.
Thus, we formally define authorized quantum com-
putation implementing 2k unitary operations {Ui} on
H⊗ninput by the existence of a quantum gate sequence
x′(G′) and quantum authorization keys {|φi〉} satisfying
the following two conditions. 1. G′ is a unitary operation
on an extended Hilbert space H⊗(m+n) satisfying Eq. (1)
for an arbitrary input state |ϕ〉 ∈ H⊗ninput. 2. There is no
polynomial quantum algorithm A such that
A : (x′(G′), |φi〉 ⊗ |ΦiN 〉) 7−→ (y(F ′), |φi〉 ⊗ |ψyx′i〉) (2)
where |ΦiN 〉 = |φj1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φjN 〉 is a product state of N
keys (iN = j1 · · · jN ∈ {0, 1}kN ) and y(F ′) is a quantum
gate sequence of a unitary operation F ′, which allows Ui
to be performed by using a forged key state |ψyx′i〉 ∈ H⊗l
(for some integer l) as
F ′(|ψyx′i〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉) =
∣∣ψ′yx′i〉⊗ Ui |ϕ〉 , (3)
for an arbitrary |ϕ〉 ∈ H⊗ninput and 〈ψyx′i|ψyx′j〉 = δij .
Next, we investigate quantum gate shuffling algorithms
for the obfuscation process. Among algorithms mapping
an element of gp(n)(U) to another element of gq(n)(U)
3where p(n) ≤ q(n), we define a completely-random shuf-
fling to be an algorithm randomly obtaining a quantum
gate sequence from all possible quantum gate sequences
of gq(n)(U). To understand the power of random shuf-
fling, we study restricted quantum gate sequences de-
noted by z(CI) of a controlled identity operation CI on
H⊗(n+1) constructed by a quantum gate sequence x(I).
For a given polynomial quantum gate sequence x(U) of a
general unitary operation U on H⊗n, we can always con-
struct a corresponding quantum gate sequence z(CU ) of
a controlled unitary operation CU on H⊗(n+1) by adding
a control qubit in front of original qubits, replacing all
the gate elements by controlled-gate operations and fur-
ther decomposing them into elementary gate operations.
This procedure can be completed in polynomial steps in
|x(U)|. Note that the restricted quantum gate sequence
z(CI) can be also constructed from x(eiθI).[5]
We consider that a quantum gate sequence x(I) ∈
gp(n)(I) is given by a non-trivial combination of elemen-
tary gates and we further apply a quantum gate sequence
of a unitary operation V acting only on the control qubit
(the first qubit) Hilbert space Hcontrol. We compare the
quantum gate sequences of (V ⊗ I)CI and CI(V ⊗ I).
If there exists a random shuffling algorithm in polyno-
mial time, both sets are given by g(V ⊗ I) and they are
identical. Thus, after the random shuffling process, we
cannot distinguish whether the quantum gate sequence
of V was originally applied from the right-hand side of
the controlled identity or from the left-hand side. Infor-
mation of the position of V is lost. This information loss
is a key idea for our security proof.
However, the existence of a completely-random gate
shuffling algorithm in polynomial time is not known and
it is unlikely. Instead, we introduce a concept of a
sufficiently-random gate shuffling algorithm. To ensure
informational indistinguishability of the applied order of
V on Hcontrol, shuffling algorithms are required that two
sets of quantum gate sequences obtained by shuffling
zl = x(V )z(CI) and zr = z(CI)x(V ) should be over-
lapped significantly. Thus we define a sufficiently-random
gate shuffling algorithm as the following: A gate shuffling
algorithm S in polynomial time is said to be sufficiently-
random if for a restricted quantum gate sequence z(CI)
constructed from arbitrary x(I) ∈ gp(n)(I) and a gate se-
quence x(V ) of V on Hcontrol, there exists a polynomial
function q(n) for the number of qubit n such that
|D(x(V )z(CI)) ∩ D(z(CI)x(V ))|
|D(x(V )z(CI)) ∪ D(z(CI)x(V ))| = O(
1
q(n)
), (4)
where D(•) is a distribution obtained by applying S on
a quantum gate sequence • in polynomial time.
Note that a sufficiently-random gate shuffling does not
require a completely-random shuffling from the follow-
ing reasons. A set of z(CI) constructed from x(I) ∈
gp(n)(I) is a subset of gp(n+1)(I) and not uniform. Thus,
D(x(V )z(CI)) and D(z(CI)x(V )) are not necessarily re-
quired to be an uniform distribution of gp(n+1)(I). Fur-
ther, q(n) of Eq.(4) may depend on z(CI) and x(V ), since
we require q(n) to be just a polynomial function.
By assuming the existence of the sufficiently-random
gate shuffling algorithm, we prove that it is quantum-
computationally difficult for Eve to perform a cracking
algorithm A defined by Eq. (2). We show that the quan-
tum computational complexity of this task is in NQP
(Non-deterministic Quantum Polynomial)-hard class by
reducing it to a NQP-Complete problem, the exact non-
identity check problem [6] of large unitary gate sequences.
The exact non-identity check problem is defined by the
following. Let x be a quantum gate sequence implement-
ing a unitary operation U with an ancilla system, decide
whether U is proportional to the identity operation, i.e.,
U = eiθI, or not. It is proven in Ref. [6] that computa-
tional complexity of the exact non-identity check problem
is NQP-Complete [7]. The class NQP is considered to be
one of the natural extensions of the class NP to quantum
computational complexity.
To apply the algorithm A to the exact non-identity
check problem, we introduce a modified non-identity
check problem by extending a quantum gate sequence
x(U) on H⊗n into a restricted quantum gate sequence
z(CU ) on H⊗(n+1). Then we apply two unitary opera-
tions VL and VR on H (the controlled qubit) from the
left hand side and the right hand side of CU . The result-
ing operation is written by C ′U = (VL ⊗ I)CU (VR ⊗ I).
Similarly to Eq. (1), this operation transforms C ′U (|φi〉⊗
|ϕ〉) = |φ′i〉 ⊗ U i |ϕ〉 for an arbitrary input state |ϕ〉 ∈
H⊗n, where i ∈ {0, 1}, |φi〉 = VR† |i〉 and |φ′i〉 = VL |i〉
for a single-qubit key state. (Note that U i denotes the ith
power U and it is different from Ui.) We state the mod-
ified non-identity check problem as the following: Given
a quantum gate sequence x(U), decide whether the quan-
tum gate sequence of C ′U is in g(G
′
0) ≡ g(VLVR ⊗ I) or
g(G′1) ≡ g((VL ⊗ I)CU (VR ⊗ I)) where U 6= I.
We investigate the action of the algorithm A on
a sufficiently-random shuffled gate sequence z′(C ′U ) ∈
D(z(C ′U )). Since Eq. (2) has to be also satisfied for N key
states |ΦiN 〉 = VR† ⊗ ... ⊗ VR† |iN 〉 for iN = j1 · · · jN ∈
{0, 1}N and linearity of the algorithm, Eq. (2) holds even
if we replace the key state by any mixture of key states,
namely, |ΦiN 〉 〈ΦiN | →
∑
iN
piN |ΦiN 〉 〈ΦiN | where {piN }
is an arbitrary probability distribution. For the case of a
unitary operation C ′U , the key space Hkey does not con-
tain the dummy space. Thus, we can replace the mixture
by a completely mixed state I/2N . This means that Eve
has no advantage from collecting extra keys, instead, she
just needs to prepare I/2N by herself. Thus, we can omit
|ΦiN 〉 in Eq. (2) without loss of generality, and the action
of the algorithm A can be simplified to
A′ : (z′(C ′U ), |φi〉) 7→ (y(F ′), |φi〉 ⊗ |ψyz′i〉). (5)
Further, Eq. (5) can be represented by a CPTP map
Λz′(|φi〉 〈φi|) = |φi〉 〈φi| ⊗
∑
y p
y
z′i |y〉 〈y| ⊗ |ψyz′i〉 〈ψyz′i|,
where
∑
y p
y
x′i = 1 and y ∈ {0, 1}∗ is an abbreviation of
the quantum gate sequence y(F ′) for a unitary operation
F ′ satisfying Eq. (3). Using the Steinspring representa-
tion [8], Λz′ can be simulated by a unitary operation Wz′
4by adding an appropriate dimensional ancilla |0¯〉 = |0...0〉
as
Wz′(|φi〉 ⊗ |0¯〉) = |φi〉 ⊗
∑
y
√
pyz′i |y〉 ⊗ |ψyz′i〉 ⊗ |yz′i〉 ,(6)
where 〈yz′i|y′z′i〉 = δyy′ .
For U 6= I, note that∑
y,y′
√
pyz′0p
y′
z′1〈y|y′〉〈ψyz′0|ψy
′
z′1〉〈yz′0|y′z′1〉 = 0. (7)
Applying Wz′ on |φ+〉 ⊗ |0¯〉, where |φ+〉 = V †R(|0〉 +
|1〉)/√2, and tracing out the ancilla qubits, we obtain
Γz′(|φ+〉 〈φ+|) = tra[Wz′(|φ+〉 〈φ+| ⊗ |0¯〉 〈0¯|)W †z′ ] = I/2.
Thus, for all VL and VR and all z′(CU ) ∈ g(G′1), we have
〈φi|Γz′(|φj〉 〈φj |) |φi〉 = δij , (8)
〈φ+|Γz′(|φ+〉 〈φ+|) |φ+〉 = 1/2. (9)
For U = I, note that z(C ′I) ∈ g(G′0) = g(VLVR ⊗ I) =
g(VL′VR′ ⊗ I) for VL 6= VL′ and VR 6= VR′ where
VLVR = VL′VR′. For O(1/q(n + 1)) of the sufficiently-
random shuffled quantum gate sequences of S(z(C ′I)),
we cannot determine which VR is taken. This property
leads a contradiction if we assume that we cannot per-
form the exact non-identity check problem in polynomial
time without using a witness state.
Under the impossibility of the exact non-identity check
problem, the two probabilities given by Eqs. (8) and
(9) for U = I should not be different more than
O(1/poly). By taking VR = VL = H, where H de-
notes a Hadamard operation, we have the probabilities
〈+|Γz′(|+〉 〈+|) |+〉 = 1 and 〈0|Γz′(|0〉 〈0|) |0〉 = 1/2.
However, under the existence of sufficiently-random shuf-
fling, we can also take V ′R = V
′
L = I. To satisfy the im-
possibility of the exact non-identity check problem, the
probabilities also have to satisfy 〈0|Γz′(|0〉 〈0|) |0〉 = 1
and 〈+|Γz′(|+〉 〈+|) |+〉 = 1/2, which leads contradic-
tion to the previous results.
Thus, if there is an algorithmA, we can decide whether
an obfuscated quantum gate sequence z′(CU ), obtained
by using sufficiently-random shuffling algorithm for a
given quantum gate sequence x(U), belongs to g(G′0)
or g(G′1) by observing the difference in probabilities of
above two cases by repeating the processes many (but
polynomial) times. Then it is possible to check that the
given quantum gate sequence x(U) is an identity or not in
polynomial time. However, the exact non-identity check
problem has been shown to be NQP-complete and it is
hard to solve in polynomial time without using the wit-
ness state. Therefore, Eve’s cracking strategy A, ana-
lyzing the quantum gate sequence x′(G′) obfuscated by
the sufficiently-random shuffling algorithm S, is shown to
be a computationally hard problem even using quantum
computers.
In this letter, we propose authorized quantum com-
putation, where only a user with a non-cloneable quan-
tum authorization key can perform a unitary operation
genuinely created by a programmer. In our scheme, the
unitary operation is encrypted into another unitary op-
eration acting on a larger Hilbert space in the form of
programmable quantum arrays proposed by Nielsen and
Chuang. Further, the quantum gate sequence of the en-
crypted unitary operation is obfuscated by a sufficiently-
random shuffling algorithm and then, it is authenticated
and publicly announced. To perform the original unitary
operation, the user needs to obtain an quantum autho-
rization key, which is provided by the programmer to the
authorized user, and then performs the obfuscated gate
sequence together with the key.
The security of our authorized quantum computation
is based on the quantum computational complexity of
forging the quantum authorization key from the obfus-
cated quantum gate sequence. Under the assumption
of the existence of a sufficiently-random shuffling algo-
rithm, we have shown that the problem is NQP-hard by
reducing it to a NQP-Complete problem, the exact non-
identity check problem of large quantum gate sequences.
Therefore, our authorized quantum computation can be
computationally secure against attacks using quantum
computers.
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